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ABSTRACT
The relationship between the wealth or income of parents and children
is an important economic issue in both positive and normative senses. In
this paper, we estimate elasticities of sons' income or wealth with respect
to the. wealth of their fathers for a sample of households in nineteenth
century Utah. We find the elasticity relating the wealth of fathers to
sons to range from .10 to .34 depending on the variables held constant
suchas occupation, age and residence. Elasticities based on observation
of the wealth of fathers and sons in the same year were higher than those
based on a lagged value of the fathers' wealth. The death of the father
prior to observation of the sons' wealth increased the elasticity about
three fold. The elasticity between the income of sons and wealth of
fathers was low (.09 to .21) but significant even though the sons' incomes
were observed fifteen years after the wealth of fathers. In general, the
data suggest a persistent relationship between the economic status of
parents and their children with substantial regression toward the mean so
that an economic elite was unlikely to be based upon intergenerational







Intergenerational Effects on the Distribution
of Income and Wealth:
The Utah Experience, 1850-1900
Does our economy create an aristocracy of wealth? Regression toward
the mean is a well established principle in statistics, biology and much
of the, natural world. But how quickly does the level of economic rewards
regress toward the mean between generations? This is an important economic
issue in both positive and normative senses. Social historians have
considered the question of intergenerational mobility to be central to
judgments that might be made about some ideal of social justice.' Socio-
logists have used large quantities of occupational data to examine inter-
generational mobility.2 Scholars concerned with the distribution of
income have been quickly led to consideration of parents' income, education
and IQ as well as less quantifiable factors upon the level of income of
children.3 The key issue is the extent to which each individualstarts as
a "tabula rasa" upon which choices are made and combined with luck to
determine economic achievement. In most of this work, there is an implicit,
if not explicit, assumption that intergenerational influences conflict
with the ideals of social justice.
There are, however, few studies that have explicitly measured inter-
generational correlations of income and wealth. Nenchik has examined the
relationship between the wealth of wealthy parents and their children
using a sample from Connecticut for a period from 1930 onward.4 He
estimates the elasticity between the wealth of parents and children to be
between .69 and .79 depending on the variables included in the regression3
and the estimating procedure. Such elasticities are consistent with
regression toward the mean but suggest that the process was quite slow
since an elasticity of 1.0 would imply that no regression toward the mean
had taken place. Certainly the level of wealth in the sample (only parents
with net wealth of more than $40,000 were in the sample) affected the
estimate of the elasticity. Flenchik also found that the number of siblings
affected the wealth of the child, presumably through division of the
parents' estate amàng moreheirs.5 Lebergott has also examined intergen-
erational wealth movements for the very wealthy in a more casual way but
over a longer time period. He concludes that for his sample of very
wealthy, in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, there is substantial
regression toward themean.6 Studies of intergenerational mobility for
England have been completed by Harbury, McMahon, and others. This research,
finding little intergenerational mobility, is also generallyconfined to
the very elite.7
It is useful to divide the factors that influence the distribution of
economic rewards into three conceptual categories. There are, first, a
set of household or individual characteristics, such as education, occupa-
tion, place of residence or perhaps family size in some contexts,that can
be acquired or changed by individual decisions. Such characteristics,
which we label choice variables, involve decisions households make, often
in response to the signals of the marketplace. We assume thathouseholds
try to acquire those characteristics that maximize incomeand wealth.
Hence, an increase in the return to a particular characteristic (e.g. an
occupation) induces more households to obtain that characteristic.This
movement (e.g. occupational change) would continue until the returnto
that characteristic matches the cost of acquisition for the marginal4
household. That individuals respond to market signalled opportunities and
that the market responds to the choices that individuals makeby making
the characteristic relatively less attractive serves to dilute the
able effect of choice variables upon the individual level, andconsequently
upon the aggregate distribution, of wealth and income. In general, the
choice-market leveling process would be more pronounced on income,a flow,
than on wealth, a stock.
Households also have characteristics which, in contradistinction to
choice variables, are not under the control of the individual and therefore
cannot evoke a choice-market leveling process although the marketmay
respond in a variety of ways to such characteristics. Characteristics
such as race, gender, IQ and birthplace are not matters of choice so that
a household may not be able to change these characteristics regardless of
the relative return or penalty associated with them. We consider such
variables as Ricardian since they share the essential characteristic that
land possessed in Ricardo's model of distribution--namely inelastic supply.
Clearly, such Ricardian characteristics as sex and IQ do affect the level
and distribution of income and wealth. In addition, an ex ante choice
variable is Ricardian ex post in the sense that one can choose a new
alternative but one cannot change the historical path of past choices nor
their cumulative effects. For example, a previous occupational choicemay
affect current and future income; that previous choice is currently a
Ricardian characteristic since it cannot be changed regardless of the
return conditional on alternative choices in the past and even though the
characteristic itself may be changed.8 Or, for example, the wealth of a
household may be influenced by the decision and timing of a decision to
migrate to a particular place. The migration decision is volitional ex5
ante but may continue to affect the level of wealth long after thechoice
has been made so that a clear difference in wealth positions is observable
between those who did and those who did not migrate to a particularplace.9
The final influence upon the level and distribution of income and
wealth is stochastic. Attempts to explain the distribution of earnings or
income with observable variables usually fall short of explaining asmuch
as fifty percent of the variance. Perhaps as a consequence,stochastic
theories of income distribution have been a dominant theme in thedistri-
butional literature.'0 Moreover, if markets adjust quickly in ways
consistent with income or wealth maximizing choices, a model of income
determination comprised of choice variables and a random elementwould
yield results that suggest that the stochastic factors wereall important
since the income differentials from different choices would havebeen
quickly narrowed by market forces.
We have developed these arguments more extensively elsewhereand have
tried, in particular, to separate the three differingeffects.11 In this
paper we push the analysis a differentdirection with some tentative
explorations about the nature and importance of intergenerationalfactors
in determining the individual level and aggregate distributionof income
and wealth. We view the impact of parents on the income orwealth of
their children as another kind of Ricardian effect. Parents'wealth or
income, their financing of educational investmentfor their children,
decisions about the number of siblings a child will have, parents' ageat
death and decisions about inter vivos gifts or inheritance areto a large
degree, if not completely, beyond the controlof children. Any of the
mentioned parental characteristics as well as others mayaffect the distri-
bution and level of wealth and income of children. It maybe useful,6
however, to consider separately the effects that such parental character-
istics have on subsequent choices that children make frompure transfers
of income or wealth between generations. We consider, then, in thispaper
general intergenerational correlations and attempt a partial decomposition
of these correlations into effects attributable topure transfer and those
attributable to choices that children make. A residual categorymay
reflect the effect of parental characteristics on environment or perhaps
IQ issues that we also partially address.
The following section considers more fully intergenerational rela-
tionships in the determinants of income and wealth. Next, the data set
collected for nineteenth-century Utah will be briefly described since we
test against these data. The major section of the paper will explore a
number of intergenerational patterns within the Utah economy of that
period. A short conclusion follows.
INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF ECONOMIC REWARI)S
Parentsinfluence the income and wealth of their children through
many diverse channels. The principal task of the researcher is to tease
out the marginal effects on wealth and income of children of the various
intergenerational transmission mechanisms, and, importantly, to find the
interactive elements of the story. For example, parents may clearly
increase the wealth of their children through bequest. The extent of this
material inheritance is affected, however, by family size if the inherit-
ance pattern tends to be multigeniture. In general, one would expect
interactions between demographic variables, such as family size and death
age of parents and the mechanisms, such as material bequest, education,
occupational choice and IQ, by which parents influence the economic
success of their children. Indeed, the persistent demographic trends7
toward smaller families and longer individual life expectancysuggest
interesting possibilities in terms of intergenerationaleconomic patterns.
Does the trend toward fewer children increase ordecrease economic
mobility between generations? It could be arguedthat the trend toward
the two-child family that seems to characterizemodern industrialized
societies will reduce the intergenerational mobilityespecially if family
size is inversely correlated with income andeducation. The educational
level of the childrn is affected by theeducational level of the parents.12
One would expect the decline in family size to tightenthe relationship
between the educational levels of highly educated parentsand their children.
Such parents will be able to invest more timeand money in their fewer
children. One would also expect that parentswould have more ego involve-
ment in the education of each child whenthere are fewer children. Thus,
one might expect more regressiontoward the mean in the educational levels
of children relative to the educationallevels of parents when family size
is larger. If this is true, the declinein family size should reduce
intergenerational economic mobility and increasethe influence of parents
on children's economic rewards.It should be noted that families with
lower levels of educational attainment arealso likely to educate children
to higher levels when family size issmaller. Thus, the asymmetric rela-
tionship between the decline in familysize and both income and educational
levels serves to decrease economic mobility.
Similar interactions between family sizeand occupational choice
might be expected.13 Parents with highstatus occupations will have
stronger effects on the occupationalstatus of children if family size is
small. Thus regression toward the meanof the occupational hierarchy is
reduced with smaller family size among higher
occupational status families.8
It is doubtful that there are offsetting effects at the other end of the
occupational scale.
Thus there are likely to be predictable relationships between family
size and education and occupation; similar arguments could be made for IQ.
These are all ways in which parents might affect children's characteristics,
either choice or Ricardian. However, direct material bequest is clearly a
way that parents with wealth can directly influence the wealth position,
and perhaps income position as well, of their children.
Parents who happen to be in the upper strata of the income or wealth
distribution due to high educational attainment, high IQ, good occupational
choice or luck can prevent what regression toward the economic mean that
might be in store for their children by giving them wealth that will
ensure their relative position. Obviously, the strategy that parents
follow in inheritance disbursement will be crucial. Primogeniture, for
example, will tend to generate a more unequal distribution than a multi-
geniture system.14 Further, if parents offset the inequalities in the
economic condition of their children by giving larger inheritances to
children whose economic fortunes are less bright, they will narrow the
range of inequality and, at the same time, keep their children from moving
downward economically as might otherwise be the case.15 Larger family
size combined with multigeniture reduces the impact of inheritance. Since
the poor leave little or no wealth to their children, the downward trend
in family size interacts with inheritance to reduce intergenerational
economic mobility.
Regression toward the mean occurs because parents who were economi-
cally successful are unable to pass on the characteristics (and luck) that
made them successful and those who were unsuccessful are similarly unable9
to pass on unsuccessful traits (and bad luck). It seems plausiblethat
smaller family size will reduce the overall regression toward the mean
across generations so that there will be less intergenerationaleconomic
mobility, ceteris paribus.
A common advertising theme for life insurance companies is to show
the son who would have gone to college to become a doctor if hisfather
had not died an early death leaving the family impoverished becauseof the
loss of the father's income stream. A common theme of TV dramas concerns
the schemes of children to do away with elderly parents who are consuming
their wished-for inheritance by refusing to die. The death ageof the
parents is likely to affect the economictransmission mechanism between
generations just as family size does. The trend inlife expectancy, to
the extent that it reflects some increase in adult life expectancy, gener-
ates two offsetting effects on intergenerational economic patterns.The
reduction in the probability of the death of a father and (to alesser
extent) mother during working age will tend to improve theeconomic posi-
tion of children. Conversely, the longer life expectancywith retirement
may have the effects of reducing thematerial inheritance of the children
from their parents.16
Conjecture about the potential intergenerationaleconomic relation-
ships is a poor substitute for intergenerationaldata. Unfortunately,
such data are quite rare. Intergenerational samplestend to be small,
often concentrated in the most wealthy strata of thedistribution and
difficult to analyze. 1enchik's sample contained 173 casessuitable for
regression. Brittaints data contain about 250brothers so that there are
fewer than 125 parents in thesample.17 Larger and more numerous samples
are needed if the intergenerational transmissionmechanism of economic10
status is to be understood. The date for Utah in the nineteenth century
holds promise as one addition to the sparse intergenerational data bank.
UTAH DATA SET
Nineteenth-century Utah is uniquely suited for the creation of an
intergenerational sample. This uniqueness is generated by the conjunction
of several data sources. The first of these is the U.S. census. The
censuses of 1850, 1860 and 1870 are unusual in that each contained question
about wealth. In 1850, the census marshal asked each household to estimate
the value of the real property of the household. In 1860 and 1870, the
marshal also requested, in addition, the value of personal property so
that the sum of the real estate and personal property give an estimate of
total wealth. The households were not to consider mortgage or liens
against the wealth so that the estimate is of gross wealth. The census
wealth estimate would probably be lower than gross wealth obtained from
probates since it is likely that individuals underestimated their personal
property for the census marshal because of the diversity of personal
wealth. The probate usually has some kind of itemization of personal
wealth and is, therefore, likely to be higher.18 The census also contains
data on occupation, birthplace, sex, city and county of residence, age and
household size. We have collected the census data described above on all
households in the Utah census for the 1850-1870 period. We then linked
together any households that appeared in more than one census. The linkage
was accomplished by hand rather than computer. Name spellings often
deviated since the census marshal wrote the names. Age, birthplace and
occupation were useful sources for linkage. We later used demographic
records to check the linkages made. During this period of time Utah was
growing rapidly due to migration of Mormons from the mid-western U.S. and11
northern Europe. Thus, of the 19,137 households appearing in the 1870
census, 2411 households also appear in the 1860 census; 211 households
also appear in 1850 but not 1860; while 480 households appear in all three
censuses.
Most of the households of nineteenth-century Utah belonged to the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). The Church kept
extensive records of contributions made by members. Members were asked to
pay a tenth of their income to the Church. In some years, theChurch
recorded their payment and the percentage this payment was of one tenth of
the households income.19 These Church records are obviously not a perfect
source of income estimation, but they do compare favorably with the few
alternatives. For example, an examination of the individuals who paid
income tax during the Civil War in the U.S. and contributions to the
Church indicate that the income estimated from the Church records would on
average be higher than the income estimated from the taxrecords. We have
collected data on all the individuals on the Church records for twelve
different years between 1855 and 1900. We have linked these records
together for a sample of 8600 individuals some of whom are also in the
census records.
The Mormon Church encourages its members to do extensive genealogy
research resulting in the intergenerational linkage of many nineteenth-
century Utah families. The Genealogical Society Library ofthe Church in
Salt Lake City contains a large collection of forms called "family group
sheets" that list the vital statistics on a family. These family group
sheets greatly facilitate the intergenerational linkage ofhouseholds.2°
We combined the family group sheets (vital statistics and kinships), the
Church records (income and place of residence) and census records (wealth12
and occupation) to create an intergenerational sample of fathers, Sons and
brothers. Currently there are twelve potential income observations (1855,
1857, 1859, 1861, 1866, 1870, 1875, 1880, 1885, 1890, 1895, and 1900),
three potential wealth observations (1850, 1860 and 1870) and demographic
data on family members (date and place information on birth, marriage and
death). Clearly, for any given combination of observations on both fathers
and sons the sample size shrinks quickly. For example, if we consider
Sons who made contributions to the Church in 1885 for whom we also have
the percentage those contributions were of income and relate this to
fathers with wealth in 1870, our sample size shrinks to 469 father-son
combinations. If we further constrain the sample to cases where the
father had died before 1885, the sample is reduced to 170. We hope to add
wealth observations for later years (through probate and tax records) and
more individuals to the intergenerational sample.
A feature of the Utah sample that provides opportunity but creates
difficulties is that a percentage of the population practiced polygyny
(polygamy) during this period. The Mormon Church encouraged wealthier
members to marry more often so that there will be a correlation between
wealth, income and number of wives. Furthermore, polygyny will signifi-
cantly affect the bequest patterns and therefore the intergenerational
patterns. We have not really come to grips with the analytical problems
intrinsic in this feature of the data.
Before moving to a summary of the intergenerational patterns within.
the Utah data, it may prove useful to examine the distributional structure
of Utah in the nineteenth century as well as some of the findings to date
concerning the determinants of household wealth. The period from 1850 to
1870 was a time of rising inequality in Utah. Table 1 compares the level13
of inequality in Utah to that of the United States as a whole.In 1850,
shortly after Mormons had settled in Utah, the distributionof wealth as
measured by value of real property was more equal in Utah thanit was in
the U.S. But, there was a definite trend toward more inequality as
reflected by the data for 1870. The wealth held by the top 1%is actually
higher in Utah than the U.S. though the Ginicoefficient is lower. There
is no way, at present, to ascertain whether or notthe trend toward more
inequality continued beyond 1870. It is unlikelythat the distribution of
wealth or income .became more unequal than that of theU.S.
While Utah is experiencing an increase in inequality, thereis sub-
stantial economic mobility during the 1850-1870 period as measure bythe
movement of households within the distribution ofwealth from one census
year to the other. Table 2 reportsthe movement of 2192 households rela-
tive to each other between 1860 and 1870. Thehouseholds are divided into
deciles for 1860 and 1870 so that a transitional matrixis formed to
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measure the economic mobility within the economy. Random movement of
households would imply an expected value of .1 in eachcell of the matrix
with expected mean decile in 1870 equal to 5.5 regardlessof the initial
decile in 1860. The upper tail of the wealth distributiondisplays consi-
derable immobility while much of the rest of the matrix suggestsnear
randomness. Thus, the Utah economy, perhaps like many others,was fairly
open to movement except at the very top.
Regressions reported elsewhere have shown someof the important
influences upon the level of wealth for householdsof the 1850-1870
period.22 In addition to the anticipated effects of age and occupation
upon wealth, time of entry, placeof residence, birthplace and sex of the
household head have significant impacts uponhousehold wealth. For an OLS14
regression including age, age2, occupations, county of residence, birth-
place, sex of household head, migration between census years and duration
measured by first appearance in the census, duration was influentialupon
the level of wealth, contributing 231% higher level of wealth ceteris
paribus. Foreign birth of the household head reduced wealth to about 80%
of the control group level; rural residence about 60% of the controlgroup
level; female headed household about 76% of that level. In more complex
regression formulations, it becomes clear that the path of choices that
the households made about occupation and place of residence retained
influence upon wealth over time.23 Someone moving from a craft to a
farmer had a different wealth position ceteris paribus than someone who
remained a farmer for both periods of observation. This result is not
surprising but should be kept in mind when considering the intergenera-
tional effects since part of the influence of parents is to give children
an economic legacy in terms of an initial place of residence (urban-rural)
and probably occupation as well.
To summarize, Utah during this period is characterized by rising
inequality, high levels of economic mobility for the same household
observed at two different points in time, and substantial influence by
Ricardian elements such as birthplace, sex of household head and decisions
taken earlier. The stage is then set to examine intergenerational rela-
tionships that may exist. It should be emphasized that the results reported
here are preliminary since the data set is still in the process of creation
and may contain errors of construction as yet undetected.
INTERGENERATIONALCORRELATIONS WITHIN THE UTAHSAMPLE
We assume a specification throughout the workreported here that
transformseither the income or wealth observationsby the natural logarithm.15
Other variables are not transformed, hence the specification is log-log
when wealth or income appears as a regressor (e.g. father's wealth) and
log-untransformed otherwise. When a regressor has been transformed by the
natural logarithm, the regression coefficient is interpreted as an elasti-
city; when no transformation has occurred the coefficient is interpreted
as the percentage change in wealth or income attributable to the regressor
(characteristics) of interest. Thus,
n
i a i i
w. =e0 jj andln(w.) =a0
+f3x.
where one of the X (jth characteristic of ith individual) is ln(wi ) father
and the other variables are those described in Table 3.
We first consider simple models of the contemporaneous correlation of
Sons' and fathers' wealth, Table 4. While the results reported in Table 4
use data for 1870, essentially the results are obtained when 1860 data are
used. In 1870, then, the simple elasticity, adjusting only for age and a
possible life cycle (ln(W) =a+bage+cage2+dln(FW))is .302. For
this sample, fathers were about thirty years older than sons and held
about two-thirds more wealth on average, with the respective means being
$812 and $1353. However, the contemporaneous correlation is lower than a
comparable correlation when the father is dead. That is, among those
whose father has died, there is a higher correlation between a son's
wealth and father's wealth prior to death than between living sons and
fathers. This obviously suggests that inheritance matters in this economy
since inheritance cannot be a factor in a contemporaneous relationship
between the wealth of sons and their fathers. However, contemporaneous
elasticities greater than zero suggest that something more than direct
transfer is a part of the relationship we observe and that the correlation16
may reflect some indirect influences of parents on children through IQ,
educational levels, occupational choices, cultural influences, nepotism as
well as direct, inter vivos, transfers. It would be useful to separate
the contemporaneous correlation between wealth of fathers and sons into
the marginal effects of each component. To do so requires endogenization
of all intergenerational influences--a formidable exercise, and one that
is not possible with our data. We can only consider, as a consequence,
some of the influences on son's wealth and possible relationships between
those influences and parental influence.
We do not have data on education, likely to be a key intergenerational
variable. However, for nineteenth century U.S. society, education beyond
basic skills was probably not as important to wealth accumulation and high
income as education is for the twentieth century. We can explore other
variables however. Consider first, equation 1 of Table 4. We have expanded
the specification to include birthplace, age, the portfolio division
between real and personal wealth, county of residence, and father's age
and wealth. We find a pronounced life cycle in wealth holdings, with
wealth increasing with age at a decreasing rate and then declining slightly
in later years. Foreign birth reduces an individual's wealthholdings by
29 percent relative to US born individuals with otherwise comparable
characteristics. This is an obvious effect of parental choice on the
wealth of children.
The portfolio variable is also a significant determinant of wealth
since a 10% increase in the share of one's wealth held in real estate
increased wealthholdings by 4.7%. This portfolio effect reflects the fact
that there were significant pressures against the land supply suitable for
productive activity in Utah so that capital gains on land exceeded capital17
gains derived from other forms of wealthholding. Neither time of entry
into the economy CT) nor county of residence (based on an urban-rural
dichotomy with U70 indicating residence in Salt Lake County) were signifi-
cant determinants with wealth.
The elasticity of son's wealth with respect to father's wealth is now
.26. Father's age appears to have no impact on son's wealth but is retained
in the regressions to attempt to normalize father's wealth for life cycle
influences. Thus, in equation 1 we have adjusted for son's age, birthplace,
portfolio decisions, county of residence and father's age; yet, the elas-
ticity of wealthholding between father and son has only fallen by 14% from
.301 to .26.
In equation 2, occupation is added to the variables included in
equation 1. The occupational responses given in the census have been
classified into five categories--white collar and professionals, craftsmen,
service workers, laborers, and farmers. The occupation of farmer is added
to U.S. birth and rural residence as the control or reference group. One
would expect some of the contemporaneous influence of parents upon the
economic position of their children to be transmitted through the selection
of occupation by the children. While the occupational classifications do
Increase the proportion of the variance in wealth that is explained, the
elasticity of son's wealth with respect to father's wealth only falls
slightly from .26 to .22. An occupational classification of whitecollar
or professional significantly increases wealth while classificationof
laborer reduces wealth substantially. The effects of birthplace and
portfolio holding are diluted slightly with the addition of occupation as
a variable. In terms of simple correlations, there is virtually norela-
tionship between occupational choice of sons as craftsmen orservice18
workers and father's wealth. Higher father's wealth increases theprobab-
ility of the sons being a white collar or professional (simple correlation
is .20). Lower father's wealth increases the probability that theson
will be a laborer (simple correlation is -.25). But, clearly,occupational
classification is not the major transmission mechanism for the parental
influence upon son's wealth. Nevertheless, the intergenerational wealth
elasticity falls from .31 to .22 or by 27 percent when the effects of
birthplace, portfolio choice and occupation are controlled for. There are
two interesting observations about this change. First, it is clear that
children of wealthy parents make choices different from children of less
wealthy parents--when we allow for sons to have differing characteristics,
the impact of fathers' wealth declines. Second, there remains astrong
impact of father's wealth on son's holdings, that is independent of some
individual characteristics such as age, birthplace, portfolio composition,
and occupation.
Presumably, if this independent impact is through the environment,
genetics, social contacts, etc., the effect should be independent of the
time of measurement. We have already noted that comparable findings hold
for 1860 contemporaneous data. However, if one selects a sample of fathers
in 1860 with Sons in 1870, and estimates a specification comparable to
those reported in Table 4 but with fathers 1860 wealth rather than the
contemporaneous observation, the elasticity falls from .22 to .10 (results
are summarized in Table 5). The coefficients of the sons' other charac-
teristics (age, birthplace, county of residence and occupation) are similar
for 1870 and 1860 even though the samples are different. The exceptions
to these similarities are the portfolio variable where the effect is
significantly higher in 1860 and the classification as laborer in 1860
which has less effect than the same classification in 1870.19
We know that there is considerable wealth mobilityfrom 1860 to 1870
but that mobility is not a satisfactory explanationof the fall in the
elasticity of the intergenerational effectsince there is no reason to
believe that the 1870 observation on father'swealth is superior to the
observation in 1860. We simply do not expectthe kind of decay in effect
suggested by the results and the results are puzzling.
Using a sample of sons with fathers holdingwealth ten years earlier
does allow us to get at bequest a little more preciselysince we can
select those Sons whose fathers died in thedecade between 1860 and 1870.
One such specification is reported as equation2 in Table 5. The sample
is, unfortunately, small with only64 cases. We find, however, that the
intergenerational wealth elasticity increasesthreefold, to .34. The
major difference between this sampleand the one where the elasticity is
around .1 is that the father is dead. Hence, wemust be picking up an
inheritance effect. Note that the size ofthe elasticity suggests substan-
tial regression toward the mean but not independenceof son's position
from father's position. The suggested inheritanceeffect is, moreover,
less than that suggested by Menchik's sampleof the wealth in Connecticut.
There are several plausible reasons for thelower estimated elasticity.
The Utah population is much poorer and representsthe whole spectrum of
the wealth distribution while Menchik's sampleis the richest extreme of
the wealth distribution. A segment ofthe Utah population practiced
polygamy so that the typical patternof wealthholding (parents, then
mother after father's death, then childrenafter mother's death) has no
meaning for the polygamist family.Finally, family size is much largerin
the Utah sample. Nevertheless, the increasein the intergenerational
wealth elasticity when the sample isrestricted by the death of the father
is quite large.20
The structure of the sample changes when the limitation of prior
death of the father is imposed upon the data. The percentage that are
foreign born increases slightly while the effect of foreign birth falls by
36%. The mix of wealth shifts in favor of real wealthholding rather than
possession of personal wealth. Further, the elasticity of wealth with
respect to the portfolio choice increases by 47%. This result suggests
that fathers tended to bequeath land to their sons if there was an inheri-
tance and that such bequests of land enhance wealth because of the in-
creased capital gains of land relative to personal wealth. Those whose
father had died prior to 1870 were slightly older, which is to be expected,
and tended to be farmers, again reflecting the inheritance of land. The
Sons in the sample restricted to the death of the father prior to 1870
were wealthier than the average son in 1870 ($1119 compared to $846) while
the fathers in that sample are poorer ($863 compared to $1119). This
structural change is due in large part to the life cycle effect.
Table 6 reports the intergenerational effect of father's wealth upon
the income of the sons. The data necessary to compute the estimate of the
incomefrom the Church records exists for the largest sample in 1885
so that year will be the focus of the regressions for income. Equation 1
gives the results for all sons on whom we have income data for 1885 and
equation 2 is confined to those sons whose fathers had died prior to 1885.
The structures of the two samples in terms of age, birthplace and county
of residence are quite similar. The primary structural change between the
two regressions is the older age of fathers in 1870 for the sample with
fathers dying prior to 1885. Son's income and father's wealth have higher
mean values for the prior death sample ($457 and $1620 compared to $358
and $1366 respectively).21
Equations 1 and 2 of Table 6 show similar effects of age, birthplace
and county of residence upon income. Unlike the wealth patterns we have
reported, the life cycle for income does not peak within the plausible age
range although it does have a concave path relativeto age in both equa-
tions. Foreign birth reduces income (effect is not statistically signi-
ficant in equation 2) but the effect is not as large as it is on wealth.
County of residence has a larger impact on income than itdoes on wealth
with residence in the urban county increasing income significantly.
Father's wealth in 1870 has an impact on the income of the son in 1885
with an elasticity of .135 where all Sons are considered and an elasticity
of .212 where only sons whose fathers have died are considered.
We obviously do not know what the contemporaneous elasticities are
since our last observation for wealth is in 1870. Hence, we do notknow
whether the contemporaneous elasticities would be larger than those reported
here. It is striking, however, that we find a fairly large impactthat
persists over the decade and one half interval, again suggestingthat
father's wealth is correlated with unmeasured sons' characteristicsthat
are independent of time (e.g. genetic, cultural, environmental,etc.). In
addition, we find a spread in the impacts for Sons withdeceased fathers
that is consistent with explicit intergenerational transfers ofwealth
(which then affect the income stream of the recipient).
It now remains to examine the effect of family size and earlydeath
of a father upon the wealth and income position of Sons inthe sample. It
was postulated earlier in the paper that larger familysize should attenuate
the relationship between the economic position of a fatherand son. It
was also suggested that early death of a fatherwould adversely affect the
economic position of children. Table 7 is a rough attempt toexamine the22
initial relationship between some demographicvariables and intergenera-
tional patterns of wealth and income. Two variablesare entered into
these regressions to reflect family size andpremature death of a father.
SIB is calculated by subtracting infantmortality from the the children of
a father. It should be noted thatmany of the siblings counted under this
variable may be half brothers or sisters to theindividual being examined
in the regression since the practice ofpolygyny created a very complex
kinship network. The mean number of the SIB variablevaries from 8 in the
early part of the period to 13 in the latteryears. FDE is a dummy vari-
able that indicates that the father died beforeage sixty.
The sibling variable is significant inonly one of the four regres-
sions reported in Table 7. In equation 3 where thesample is constrained
to Sons whose fathers have died, an increase inthe number of siblings
living to adulthood reduces income by a small amount. Forexample a
farmer in Salt Lake County who is U.S.born, fifty years of age, whose
father was average in age and wealth in1870, would have a 13% lower
income in 1885 if he had ten siblings instead offive. In each of the
regressions where the SIB variable has been entered, thecoefficient has
been negative though not often significant.Similarly, the dummy for
death of the father has a negative coefficient butis not significant in
either case.
Even though the early death of the father andfamily size are not
statistically significant variables in the simple regressionsor speci-
fications reported here, their inclusion as variablesdoes change the
elasticity of intergenerational wealth. Inclusion of the SIB variable
raises the elasticity between father's and son's wealthby 23% from .22 to
.27. This is the expected direction of change of theelasticity suggesting23
that family size does interact with the father's wealth. The inclusionof
the SIB and FDE variables also increases the elasticity of intergenerational
wealth in equation 2 of Table 7; but in this case the effect is much
smaller. This is a curious result since the sample of equation 2 is
confined to Sons whose fathers have died so that the inheritance effectis
measured. The effect of introducing demographic variables to the income
equations for 1885 is to reduce the elasticity betweenson's income and
father's wealth in both instances. The results of the introductionof
both a sibling variable and a variable for the death age of the father
indicate that there may be offsetting relationships between wealth, income,
family size and perhaps the death age of the father. For example, one
would expect an increase in the number of siblings to reduce thematerial
inheritance and possibly dilute other intergenerational mechanisms.
However, economic success may induce a larger family sizefor parents so
that family size may proxy for economic success of the father not fully
captured by the measure of wealth in 1870.
CONCLUSION
The Utah data for the nineteenth century indicate that thereis a
persistent relationship between father's andson's wealth. This rela-
tionship exists prior to inheritance of wealth by a son uponthe death of
his father, and consequently reflects the genetic orcultural inheritances
that might be. In addition to these inheritances, thefather determines
the initial position in terms of residence and to a lesserextent occupa-
tion from which the son makes choices. That endowmentof an initial
position is an important component of theRicardian heritage of an indi-
vidual. The fact that introduction of birthplace andurban residence
change the intergenerational wealth elasticityis evidence of the impact24
that the initial position from which a son started within the Utaheconomy
is important. The intergenerational elasticity increases with the death
of the father as expected.
The introduction of the demographic variables of family size and
early death of the father proved to have little impact in a simple OLS
regression. The coefficients displayed consistent plausible signs but
appeared to have little effect. The suspicion that there are strong
multidirectional relationships between these variables and economic vari-
ables suggests that a more rigorously specified set of equations may be
needed to fully explore the demographic issues relative to intergenera-
tional economic patterns.
Much more work needs to be done on the Utah data in order to bring
the sample to full usefulness as a testing ground for intergenerational
economics. The death of the mother should be added as should birth order
and the more complex aspects of the marriage structure implied by poly-
gamous marriages. We intend to add more data in order to possibly increase
sample size and to add estimates of wealth through use of probate or tax
data. Nevertheless, this preliminary exploration provides sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that the economic position of parents provides
another Ricardian influence to the determination of the level and distri-
bution of income and wealth. The magnitude of this influence is not
extremely large and regression toward the mean appears to be a dominating
tendency within the intergenerational economic process.25
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Table 1
Comparison of Wealth in Utah and the United States
1850 1870
United States Utah United States Utah
Mean real wealth $1001 $201 $1782 $644
Proportion holding
real wealth .41 .70 .43 .64
Share of wealth held
by top one percent .30 .14 .24 .27
Share of wealth held
by top ten percent .73 .52 .70 .61
Mean wealth of foreign
born/mean wealth of
U.S. born (whites) .49 .77 .61 .70
Gini coefficient for
real wealth .86 .69 .84 .74
Gini coefficient for
total wealth .81 .70
Note: The sample procedures are such that the means and Gini coefficients
are based on all males over age twenty and for the U.S. are based
on all male heads of household over age twenty for Utah. The top
percentiles are based on males over age twenty in both instances.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1. LSW7O Natural Logarithm of a son's wealth as reported for
1870.
2. LFW7O Same as above for a father in 1870.
3. LFW6O Same as above for 1860.
4. Age Son's age in the year wealth or income is observed.
2 5. Age Variable 4 squared.
6. FBE If foreign born, FEE 1.
7. Port 7 Ratio of the value of wealth in the form of real
estate to total wealth.
8. T 1860 minus the year the household is first observed
in Utah.
9. W Occupation classified as white collar or professional.
10. C Occupation classified as skilled craftsman.
11. S Occupation classified as a service worker.
12. L Occupation classified as an unskilled laborer.
13. U70 If county of residence was Salt Lake County in 1870,
U70 =1.
14. U85 Same as above for 1885.
15. FAGE Father's age in the year that wealth is observed.
16. Sib Number of siblings or half-siblings (father's side)
who do not die in infancy.
17. FDE If father died before age 60, FDE =1.
18. N Sample size.
19. Explained variance of regression.
20. F F value for either the equation or the variable in
question.Equation 1 and 2 are based on all combinations of fathers and sons in the
sample with wealth greater than zero in 1870.
Variables are defined in Table 3.
31
Table 4
Contemporaneous Intergenerational Wealth Regressions
1 2

















FBE .30-.288 7.5 .30 -.262 6.4
Port7 .56 .473 5.9 .56 .4314.98
T .45 .0072 .4 .45 .004 .16
W .05 .47 4.3
C .08 -.31 3.0
S .05 -.01 0
L .16 -.31 5.3
U70 .15-.0028 0 .15 .10 .5
LFW7O 7.21 .260 26.0 7.21 .22 18.1






















34.9 .0988 7.9 40.3 .236 2.8
1301-.0010 5.1 1691 -.003 3.1
FBE .31-.199 3.8 .34 -.128 .3
Port7 .57 .985 26.1 .63 1.450 8.0
T 1.84 .014 1.8 4.8 .012 .1
W .04 .650 8.9 .02 .766 1.0
C .08-.140 .7 .11 -.754 5.8
S .06 .071 .1 .06 -.360 .7
L .16-.050 14.3 .06 -.760 3.3
U70 .18-.198 2.6 .19 .518 3.4
LFW6O 7.02 .101 3.7 6.76 .337 5.0






Equation 1 is based onall combinations where father's wealth is greater
than zero in 1860 andson's wealth is greater than zero in 1870.




Equation 1 Equation 2




50.6 .037 52.2 51.0 .02511.4
Age 31690 -.00002 51.9 22691 -.0000111.4
FBE .14-.251 4.6 .12 -.151 .6
U85 .10 .381 9.4 .11 .4966.74
LFW7O 7.22 .135 10.3 7.39 .212 9.1






Equation 1 is based on all father son combinations where father'swealth
is greater than zero in 1870 and son's income may be calculated in 1885.
Equation 2 is a subset of the sample of equation 1 where the fathershad
died prior to 1885.Table 7
The Effect of Family Size and Early Death of Father on
Intergenerational Wealth and Income Relationships
Explanatory Variables:
34
Equation 1 is based on the father
zero in 1870.
son combinations with wealth greater than
Equation 2 is based on the combinations where the father died between
1860 and 1870 but son has wealth greater than zero in 1870.
Equation 3 is based on combinations where the father died between 1870 and
1885 with son's income available in 1885.
Equation 4 is based on all combinations where father has wealth in 1870 and
son has income in 1885.
Equation 1 qtion 2
Dependent Variable:LW7O LW7O Y085
Equation 3





















































2.8 .021 8.1 .038
3.1-.00001 8.1-.00002
.52 -.19 .9-.283
7.33
2.8
.85
5 .15
3.0
.631
.21 -.02811.0-.003
.02 -.15 .81
.201
-.0054
7.8
.322
.087
-.006
F
52.4
52.1
5.7
.48
4.28
1.5
.27 23.7
.005 .611
277
.37
13.11
.010 .27
.343 4.8
64
.50
3.53
.508 7.2
170
19
4.62
.40 10.3
469
18
14. 14